Facebook v. Amalgamated Bank deepened a circuit split regarding the standard for pleading for loss causation. This issue primarily stems from Facebook’s handling of user data, specifically during the Cambridge Analytica scandal. The controversy originated when Aleksandr Kogan, a professor at Cambridge University, created an app called “This is Your Digital Life” on Facebook that harvested user data.  British political consulting firm Cambridge Analytica acquired the data and used it improperly, which potentially impacted the 2016 U.S. presidential campaigns. 

The National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) requires agencies to analyze the environmental effects of proposed actions, such as infrastructure development, and incorporate those impacts in a detailed statement accompanying their proposal. NEPA stipulates that direct and indirect environmental effects must be included in this statement, defining indirect effects as those “caused by the action and are later in time or farther removed in distance, but are still reasonably foreseeable.” 40 C.F.R. §1508.1(i)(2).

This case involves the interpretation of a criminal statute, a conviction under that statute, and legislation that modifies that criminal statute. Additionally, this is a consolidated case of three confederates who applied individually for certiorari. At its core, it raises questions about how changes in law apply to sentences that have been vacated.

Relevant here is section 924(c). This statute targets individuals who “during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime . . . use[] or carr[y] a firearm[.]” Section 924(c)(1)(C) provides minimum sentences for repeat offenders, but its text and application have changed over time.

While it is uncontested that the First Amendment’s freedom of speech clause protects political speech, it is contested as to how far in scope the clause extends to protect sexual or obscene material such as pornography. Historically, the Supreme has distinguished between obscene sexual material and non-obscene sexual material, treating the former as outside the scope of the First Amendment and the latter as within the scope. Thus, the Court treats non-obscene sexual content as constitutionally protected to the fullest extent for adult consumers, while permitting that it may be rationally restricted for minors. Id. While legislatures may permissibly limit minors “access to sexual content, laws that consequently burden adults” access to such content “can stand only if [they] satisf[y] strict scrutiny.” United States v. Playboy Ent. Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000); Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 665-66 (2004); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997); Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).

The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) imposes heightened pleading requirements for plaintiffs filing federal securities fraud class action lawsuits. Specifically, plaintiffs raising a claim of securities fraud must “state with particularity all facts on which” they base their belief that a false statement was made by a defendant corporation and “state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference” that the defendant in making those false statements acted with scienter, or intent. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)(B) and (2)(A).

This case presents a circuit split on the interpretation of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act's (FSIA) expropriation exception, specifically concerning the “commercial nexus” requirement and pleading standards. The dispute arises from a case filed by plaintiffs, mostly foreign nationals, seeking compensation for personal property seized by Hungary or MÁV (the Hungarian national railway) during the Holocaust in 1944. See Simon v. Republic of Hungary, 37 F. Supp. 3d 381, 385–386 (D.D.C. 2014); Simon v. Republic of Hungary, 77 F.4th 1077, 1091–92 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (Simon III).

The FSIA's expropriation exception removes a defendant's immunity when the matter concerns property rights taken in violation of international law, and the property has a “commercial nexus” with the United States.

In March 2023, Tennessee enacted the Prohibition on Medical Procedures Performed on Minors Related to Sexual Identity, Senate Bill 1 (“SB1”). SB1 was enacted as part of a series of laws targeting transgender individuals in Tennessee.  SB1 declared that Tennessee has a “compelling interest in encouraging minors to appreciate their sex, particularly as they undergo puberty,” and in prohibiting procedures “that might encourage minors to become disdainful of their sex.” SB1 prohibits healthcare providers from “[p]rescribing, administering, or dispensing any puberty blocker or hormone” if that treatment is provided “for the purpose” of “[e]nabling a minor to identify with, or live as, a purported identity inconsistent with the minor’s sex” or “[t]reating purported discomfort or distress from a discordance between the minor’s sex and asserted identity.”  The district court preliminarily enjoined Tennessee officials’ enforcement of the law, joining courts around the country that have held that similar laws trigger heightened scrutiny because they discriminate based on sex and transgender status.

Title 18 of the United States Code states that an offense may qualify as a “crime of violence” if it “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A). Commonly referred to as the use-of-force clause, this language appears in multiple other statues, such as in the Armed Career Criminal Act’s definition of “violent felony” and the Immigration and Nationality Act’s definition of “aggravated assault.” ​​

Richard Glossip was convicted of murder and sentenced to death in Oklahoma in 2004. Glossip has maintained his innocence consistently, and his case has drawn significant attention because of concerns about prosecutorial misconduct and the lack of physical evidence implicating him in the crime.

In 1997, Justin Sneed, an employee of Barry Van Treese at the Best Budget Inn in Oklahoma City, murdered Van Treese. Glossip also worked at the inn. While Sneed admitted to killing Van Treese, he claimed Glossip hired him to commit the crime. The police investigation was highly criticized for being cursory and overlooking potential leads. For example, the police did not search Sneed’s room at the inn, nor did they question most of the inn’s guests. Critical evidence was also released just days after the murder.

Former firefighter Karyn Stanley appeals the holding of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals that a “qualified individual with a disability” under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) does not include a former employee, and therefore a former employee may not sue for discrimination under the Act. In 1999, Stanley began working as a firefighter for the City of Sanford, Florida. Through her employment, she accrued fringe benefits such as health insurance, for which premiums were to be paid by the former employer for a certain period after the employee retires. During the course of Stanley’s employment, the city changed the period of time for which it would pay those premiums.  While the Department previously paid the premiums for all employees up to age of 65, it would now only pay for up to 24 months or until receipt of Medicare coverage, whichever comes first, for those who were placed on disability retirement contingent upon other requirements that allowed these benefits to accrue, such as length of employment.

Under the Gun Control Act of 1968, Congress requires those involved in the business of importing, manufacturing, and selling guns to “obtain a federal firearms license, keep records of the acquisition and transfer of firearms, . . . conduct a background check before transferring a firearm to a non-licensee[,]” and “mark firearms with a serial number.” 18 U.S.C. 922(t), 923(a), (g)(1)(A); 18 U.S.C. 923(i). The goals of the Act’s “comprehensive scheme” are “to keep guns out of the hands of criminals and others who should not have them” and “to assist law enforcement authorities in investigating serious crimes.” Abramski v. United States, 573 U.S. 169, 180 (2014).