Every composer in conservatory studies Igor Stravinsky. Pupils who admire his trailblazing compositional techniques might be surprised to discover his source of inspiration. Stravinsky famously declared that “a good composer does not imitate; he steals.” “Stealing” musical ideas has a rich and long history. Far from being forbidden, it has been a cornerstone in the evolution of music. J.S. Bach based his music on Lutheran hymns and drew heavily on Dietrich Buxtehude’s style. Johannes Brahms frequently invoked folk tunes by expanding musical structure laid out by his predecessors, notably Beethoven.

Oklean Jacob Ponle orchestrated a massive phishing scheme in 2019, leading to $8.03 million in actual losses and $51.3 million in intended losses to his victims. The scheme consisted of gaining unauthorized access to emails of company executives and using these emails to contact other employees with urgent demands to wire money, ostensibly for corporate needs, which ended up in the defendant’s pockets. Some of the wires were caught and reversed by banks; this is the source of the intended loss amount. After an FBI investigation and arrest, Ponle pleaded guilty to one count of wire fraud in federal court. In determining the range for his sentence, the district court consulted federal sentencing guidelines, which provide a different number of points added to a defendant’s base level depending on the monetary amount of loss.

The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects against unreasonable seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. In pertinent part, the text of the Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” Id.

On August 31, 2020, Oyoma Asinor was photographing a protest near Lafayette Park in the District of Columbia when he was arrested by the Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”). The MPD took Mr. Asinor’s cell phone, camera, and other personal items incident to the arrest but released him later that day. Mr. Asinor was never charged with any crime resulting from the arrest. Despite Mr. Asinor’s repeated requests over the following months, the MPD withheld his property for nearly a year.

The Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) is a key U.S. labor law that sets minimum standards for the administration of private pension plans and creates causes of action for employee plan participants and beneficiaries. ERISA requires administrators to act solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries of the plan and establishes they must do so “with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence” of a prudent man under the circumstances. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B). Furthermore, any fiduciary who breaches that duty may be held personally liable for the loss. Id. § 1109(a). Fiduciaries found liable for breach are subject to equitable remedial relief determined by the court, up to and including removal. Id. In an ERISA-based cause of action for the loss, there must be both a breach of fiduciary duty and a financial loss to the beneficiary.

In 1996, Congress passed the Telecommunications Act, overhauling communications law for the first time in decades. In this statute, Congress directed the FCC to establish a Universal Service Fund—a subsidy program aimed at achieving robust, nationwide telecommunication service. 47 U.S.C. § 254. The act describes principles for achieving universal service (such as telecommunications and internet service), including access to advanced services for schools, rural health care facilities, and libraries. Id. at § 254(b).

The Secretary of the Treasury and the IRS require United States citizens to report any relations with foreign banks to the U.S. government through a Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts Form, or FBAR. 31 U.S.C. § 5314, 31 C.F.R. § 1010.350. The maximum penalty for a willful violation of this reporting requirement is either $100,000 or 50% of the balance of each bank account at the time of the violation, whichever is the greater amount. 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5)(C)(i), (D)(ii).

In 2017, the Supreme Court in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California addressed the issue of specific jurisdiction in class action lawsuits. 582 U.S. 255 (2017). The case involved over 600 plaintiffs, including residents and nonresidents of California, who joined a lawsuit alleging product defects in a medication manufactured by Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMS). In response, BMS filed a motion to dismiss the nonresident plaintiffs’ claims for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Court agreed, holding that because the claims would remain the same with the exclusion of the nonresident plaintiffs, there was no basis for asserting specific jurisdiction over them. This decision reinforced the standard established in International Shoe Co. v. Washington that a defendant must have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state for the court to assert personal jurisdiction. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).

Federal law, as codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1495 and § 2513, provides the wrongfully convicted and imprisoned a mechanism to seek compensation from the United States government. 28 U.S.C. § 1495; United States v. Bala, 948 F.3d 948, 949 (8th Cir. 2020). Section 1495 grants jurisdiction for such cases to the Court of Federal Claims, but to be eligible, a person must first obtain a “certificate of innocence” from the court that reverses or sets aside the conviction. 28 U.S.C. § 2513 (a)(1). The decision to grant or deny a certificate is left to the discretion of the district court. United States v. Graham, 608 F.3d 164, 169 (4th Cir. 2010); Betts v. United States, 10 F.3d 1278, 1283 (7th Cir. 1993).

In 2017, Clarissa Gilmore visited her incarcerated husband at Smith State Prison in Glenville, Georgia. Gilmore v. GA Dep’t of Corrections, 111 F.4th 1118, 1124 (11th Cir. 2024). Upon arrival, Gilmore proceeded through three types of searches: a pat-down, a metal detector wand, and an electromagnetic-radiation body scan. Id. Gilmore had encountered these three screenings during her previous visits to the prison. Id. However, on this occasion, two correctional officers interrupted her visit with her husband and took her to an empty bathroom insisting that she sign a strip-search approval form. Id.  The officers informed Gilmore that if she didn’t consent, she “would be sent to jail and would be unable to visit her husband at the prison again.” Id. Under such pressure, Gilmore signed the form, and the correctional officers conducted the strip search. Id. Gilmore sued, claiming that the officers violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Id. at 1125. In return, the officers argued that they were protected by qualified immunity. Id.

In 2022, the Supreme Court in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen rejected the means-end analysis that federal circuits had applied to Second Amendment challenges to firearm regulations in favor of a new, burden-shifting analytical framework. 597 U.S. 1 (2022). Post-Bruen, if the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual and their conduct, the Constitution “presumptively protects that conduct.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 24. The government must then justify its regulation by demonstrating that it is “consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Id.

In June 2024, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Duarte, 101 F.4th 657 (9th Cir. 2024), reviewed the conviction of Steven Duarte under a provision of the Gun Control Act of 1968 that bars the possession of a firearm by any person “who has been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), a refugee seeking asylum must prove she “(1) has a well-founded fear of persecution; (2) on account of a protected ground [e.g., race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion]; (3) by an organization that the Salvadorian government is unable or unwilling to control” Hernandez-Avalos v. Lynch, 784 F.3d at 949 (4th Cir. 2015).

Odalis Mireida Chicas-Machado, a native citizen of El Salvador, faced escalating persecution from MS-13 gang members during her walks to and from church. Chicas-Machado v. Garland, 73 F.4th 261, 263 (4th Cir. 2023). Due to harassment from gang members to have her abet their activity—and their subsequent death threats when she refused—she sought asylum in the United States, contending that her religious beliefs and activities with the church made her a target. Id. at 264. However, both the Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denied her application, questioning the nexus between her persecution and religion, as well as the viability of her proposed social groups. Id. Chicas-Machado sought review of the decision, emphasizing the life-threatening circumstances she fled in pursuit of safety and protection. Id.

In 1989, the Supreme Court found in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services that State officials have no obligation to protect private citizens from violence or injury caused by other private citizens. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dept. of Soc. Services, 489 U.S. 189, 194 (1989) (finding county authorities not liable when a child in its custody was seriously injured by his father). Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained the Due Process Clause limits a state’s power to deprive individuals of “life, liberty, and property without due process,” but does not create an affirmative duty to protect individuals. Id. at 194, (quoting U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1). Thus, state actors cannot be held liable for harm caused to private citizens under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, in DeShaney, the Court identified two possible exceptions in which a private citizen may be entitled to protection. The first, known as the Special Relationship Exception, is often applied when a state incarcerates, institutionalizes, or restrains a person involuntarily. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 198-99; see Christopher M. Eisenhauer, Police Action and the State-Created Danger Doctrine: a Proposed Uniform Test, 120 DICK. L. REV. 893 (2016).

Judicial immunity has its roots in traditional English common law and has long been recognized by federal courts. See Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 347 (1871). The Supreme Court upheld this immunity after the passage of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which created liability for state actors who deprive citizens or other persons of their Constitutional rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1982; Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967). The question courts ask when determining liability in § 1983 cases is whether, under common law principles of immunity, the defendant would be immune from suit due to their judicial or quasi-judicial role. See, e.g. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 339-40 (1986). The Supreme Court has established a presumption that only qualified immunity is necessary for government officials, refusing to expand absolute immunity beyond what is truly necessary. Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486-87 (1991). The general test is whether the defendant is serving a function that existed—or is analogous to a function that existed—under English common law that would entitle him to absolute immunity, but courts still come to different results based on the specific test they decide to use. This is the apparent reason for the circuit split discussed below.

Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act prohibits employers from discriminating against persons with disabilities when applying for employment, hiring, and job training. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). A common issue in enforcing this act is determining what accommodations employers can be reasonably expected to provide for their employees with disabilities. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).

EEOC v. Charter Communications LLC is a suit that addresses whether the ADA requires employers to accommodate an employee’s commute to work. 75 F.4th 729 (7th Cir. 2023). The appellant, James Kimmons, was employed at a call center owned and operated by Charter Communication LLC (Charter). Kimmons requested that Charter make accommodations in his work schedule, which he claims were unlawfully denied. Due to the presence of cataracts in both of his eyes, commuting to work during evening hours became unsafe for Kimmons. Kimmons asked to modify his work schedule for thirty days to avoid traveling after sunset. Charter granted Kimmon’s initial request but did not allow Kimmons to continue working according to the modified work schedule at the end of the thirty days. The EEOC then filed a lawsuit claiming Charter’s refusal to accommodate was unlawful under Title I of the Americans with Disability Act (ADA). EEOC v. Charter Communications, LLC, 75 F.4th 729.

In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court ruled the Second Amendment confers an individual right to keep and bear arms to law-abiding, responsible citizens and “members of the political community” District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2790 (2008). In McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Court held the individual weapon-owning right to be a fundamental right incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 48 (2009).

More recently, many of the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal have examined precisely who can be considered a law-abiding citizen and members of the political community in this context. These cases have examined the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 992(g), a provision of the amended Gun Control Act of 1968 that prohibits the sale or possession of firearms to nine categories of individuals, including undocumented immigrants. Specifically, these cases have questioned whether the Second Amendment and the right to bear arms apply to undocumented immigrants, thereby making § 992(g) unconstitutional.

The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause provides that no State shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of the law.” A caveat to this right is that incarcerated individuals are not guaranteed its full scope. Because of their limited liberty rights, solitary confinement has been successfully implemented in a number of both state and federal prisons throughout the United States. In the summer of 2021, more than 6,000 inmates had been in solitary confinement for over a year. As of this week, over 10,000 inmates in federal prison alone are being held in solitary confinement.

The current circuit court split lies in whether there should be a minimum length for the duration of confinement to be considered an atypical hardship giving rise to a liberty interest.

Social media has become a prominent part of everyday life. It is regarded by many as the modern-day equivalent of the town forum. The Pew Research Center finds that over 70% of American adults use some form of social media, and almost all of those users get news content from them. It is one of the foremost means of communication in our modern world. Views of social media censorship, especially related to certain political news and politicians, have shifted in recent years. Generally, social media users have differing views on whether Big Tech should be regulated more heavily by the U.S. government in response to these perceptions of censorship.

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution protects individuals’ rights to free speech and freedom of religion. As such, the U.S. government is generally not permitted to punish individuals for exercising First Amendment free speech. This includes arrests for criminal activity made by a police officer to retaliate against an individual for their protected speech. Under 42 USC §1983, an individual can bring a civil suit for wrongful arrest, including retaliatory arrest, in violation of their First Amendment rights if there is a “but-for” causal connection between the officer’s retaliatory animus and the individual's speech. Kennedy v. City of Villa Hills, 635 F.3d. 210, 217 (6th Cir. 2011).

The First Amendment of the United States Constitution protects an individual's right to free speech and the free exercise of their religion. However, the Circuit Courts have disagreed on the line between religious freedom, free speech, and a state’s ability to protect its minor citizens from harmful practices.

Conversion therapy is a discredited therapeutic practice that seeks to change an individual’s sexual orientation from gay or bisexual to heterosexual and an individual’s gender identity from transgender or non-binary to cisgender. Mainstream psychological experts have denounced conversion therapy. The American Psychological Association states that “[conversion therapy] puts individuals at a significant risk of harm.”

Federal courts have held for decades that interactive computer services cannot be considered publishers for the purpose of determining liability to users for content published by third parties. This area of the law was developed in the infancy of the internet, and technology has advanced leaps and bounds faster than the law has.

The relevant statute in these cases is 47 U.S.C. § 230 (the Communications Decency Act of 1996), which states that “no provider or use of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” In lay terms, online media platforms (think YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, etc.) that host content created and/or shared by third-party users cannot be held liable unless the provider is directly responsible for creating it.