Sydney Hamilton | Glossip v. Oklahoma
INTRODUCTION
Richard Glossip was convicted of murder and sentenced to death in Oklahoma in 2004. Glossip has maintained his innocence consistently, and his case has drawn significant attention because of concerns about prosecutorial misconduct and the lack of physical evidence implicating him in the crime.
In 1997, Justin Sneed, an employee of Barry Van Treese at the Best Budget Inn in Oklahoma City, murdered Van Treese. Glossip also worked at the inn. While Sneed admitted to killing Van Treese, he claimed Glossip hired him to commit the crime. The police investigation was highly criticized for being cursory and overlooking potential leads. For example, the police did not search Sneed’s room at the inn, nor did they question most of the inn’s guests. Critical evidence was also released just days after the murder.
At Glossip’s first trial in 1998, Sneed’s testimony was the only evidence that linked Glossip to the murder. The state argued that Glossip hired Sneed to kill Van Treese because Glossip was afraid he was going to be fired. Despite the lack of evidence, Glossip was found guilty and sentenced to death. However, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) overturned Glossip’s conviction due to ineffective assistance of counsel. Glossip was retried in 2004 and the state revised its theory, arguing instead that it was murder for remuneration. The state alleged that Glossip promised Sneed a share of the money stolen from Van Treese if he murdered him, presenting evidence that Glossip had $1,757 in cash on him when arrested. This motive became the central factor of the prosecution’s case, and Glossip was convicted and sentenced to death again.
After Glossip’s second conviction, concerns about the case grew to the point that two independent investigations were commissioned, one by the Oklahoma legislature in 2021 and the other by the Oklahoma Attorney General in 2023. Both investigations found that Glossip was denied a fair trial and highlighted numerous issues including prosecutorial misconduct, the destruction of critical evidence, and the suppression of exculpatory evidence. After the first investigative report was published in June 2022, the state disclosed seven boxes of documents from the prosecutors’ files; after the second investigation report was published, the prosecutors released the last. The evidence found in the prosecutor’s files was significant and could have impeached Sneed as a reliable witness. It included Sneed’s psychiatric records, which revealed his history of bipolar disorder and that he had been prescribed lithium while in jail. This information contradicted Sneed’s testimony denying any psychiatric treatment and would have been crucial for the defense because it could have supported a theory of Sneed being impulsively violent. The files also included notes, which indicated that prosecutors worked with Sneed’s attorney to alter his testimony so that it would align with the medical examiner’s testimony. Sneed originally maintained that the murder weapon was a baseball bat, but later he testified that he had used a knife. Finally, the files contained evidence that the cash Glossip had when he was arrested was from selling his belongings, not from robbing Van Treese.
In light of the first investigation and the suppressed evidence, Glossip filed an application for post-conviction relief in November 2022. The OCCA denied this application and claimed that the evidence related to the knife, which was not disclosed until 2022, was not new evidence and could have been raised earlier. Glossip petitioned the Supreme Court for its review which remains pending. However, in March 2023 after the eighth box was released, Glossip filed another petition for relief and asserted Napue and Brady violations based on the note revealing Sneed’s psychiatric treatment, as well as an additional Brady claim based on the trial notes of the prosecutor and Sneed’s attorney, arguing the court should take into account the “net effect” of all of the suppressed evidence. Glossip also claimed factual innocence from separately found evidence that indicated Sneed had murdered Van Treese randomly in a methamphetamine-fueled robbery gone wrong.
In a significant turn of events, the state confessed error after the second petition and acknowledged that Glossip received an unfair trial due to the suppression of evidence. However, the OCCA declined to grant Glossip relief and overturn his conviction, holding that the suppressed evidence would not have ultimately changed the outcome of the trial. This ruling was based on a narrow interpretation of Oklahoma’s Post-Conviction Procedure Act. Glossip subsequently petitioned the Supreme Court for a stay of execution and for a writ of certiorari for review of his Napue and Brady claims based on Sneed’s psychiatric treatment, both of which have been granted.
ISSUES PRESENTED
Was the state’s suppression of Sneed’s psychiatric history and failure to correct his false testimony a violation of due process and should the entirety of the suppressed evidence be taken into account when claims are made based on Brady and Napue precedent?
In taking up this case, the Court also asked that the parties address whether it is barred from reviewing the OCCA’s decision because it rests on an “adequate and independent” state law.
ARGUMENTS
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals argues that the state did not suppress exculpatory information because the defense “knew or should have known about Sneed’s mental health issues,” since he mentioned the lithium prescription during his competency exam. It also argues that Sneed’s testimony about his treatment was not “clearly false” because there is a possibility he could have been “in denial of his mental health disorders.” Finally, the OCCA asserts that the evidence of Sneed’s treatment was not material and did not rise to the level of a Brady or Napue violation, because it would not have changed the outcome of the trial.
Glossip argues that though the defense was aware of Sneed’s lithium prescription, the state suppressed critical information for the reason behind Sneed’s medication: his bipolar disorder and psychiatric treatment. This could have enabled the defense to impeach Sneed’s testimony and challenge his credibility by demonstrating that his perception and memory of the murder could have been compromised by his untreated bipolar disorder, as well as uncovering Sneed’s previous lies about receiving treatment.
Glossip also asserts that the OCCA’s argument that Sneed might have been in denial of his bipolar disorder is irrelevant when determining if there was a Napue violation, which relies on objectively false testimony, the prosecution’s knowledge of it, and the failure to correct it. Glossip argues that the prosecution violated Napue by not correcting Sneed when he claimed to receive lithium for a cold and denied seeing a psychiatrist and that the false testimony was material as it misinformed the jury about Sneed’s mental state at the time the crime was committed. Glossip also argues that the OCCA’s analysis of the materiality of Sneed’s psychiatric treatment contradicted precedent from Kyles v. Whitley, which requires that the court evaluate the “cumulative effect” of all suppressed evidence.
Beyond Sneed’s psychiatric history, Glossip argues that the prosecution withheld other potentially exculpatory material, such as evidence that Sneed changed his testimony to match the medical examiner’s testimony at the urging of the prosecution and evidence that Glossip’s cash was from selling his possessions, which could have undermined the theory of murder-for-remuneration. Finally, Glossip claims that the OCCA’s narrow interpretation of the Oklahoma Post-Conviction Procedure Act and its refusal to accept the state’s waiver of any procedural bars does not follow its own precedent. Glossip believes that considering the alleged violations in conjunction with the suppressed evidence casts doubt on the integrity of his conviction and therefore warrants a new trial.
LOOKING FORWARD
This case holds significant implications for future claims of prosecutorial misconduct under Brady v. Maryland and Napue v. Illinois. Glossip v. Oklahoma could be a landmark case, prompting the reexamination of prosecutorial obligations under Brady and Napue and emphasizing the importance of thorough, cumulative analysis when analyzing the materiality of suppressed evidence. If the Court sides with Glossip, the case could contribute to greater protection for defendants’ rights by discouraging piecemeal disclosure tactics and fostering a more rigorous approach to procedural bars in post-conviction proceedings.
If the Court rules against Glossip, the limitations of post-conviction relief would be validated, despite the state’s admission of error, and Glossip would remain on death row. It would also weaken Brady protections, despite potential patterns of misconduct, and narrow the scope of Napue, limiting a prosecutor’s obligation to correct false testimony.
Find Sydney on LinkedIn!
