Alexandra Zimmer | Stanley v. City of Sanford, Florida

INTRODUCTION

Former firefighter Karyn Stanley appeals the holding of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals that a “qualified individual with a disability” under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) does not include a former employee, and therefore a former employee may not sue for discrimination under the Act. In 1999, Stanley began working as a firefighter for the City of Sanford, Florida. Through her employment, she accrued fringe benefits such as health insurance, for which premiums were to be paid by the former employer for a certain period after the employee retires. During the course of Stanley’s employment, the city changed the period of time for which it would pay those premiums.  While the Department previously paid the premiums for all employees up to age of 65, it would now only pay for up to 24 months or until receipt of Medicare coverage, whichever comes first, for those who were placed on disability retirement contingent upon other requirements that allowed these benefits to accrue, such as length of employment.

In 2016, Karyn Stanley was diagnosed with Parkinson’s disease but maintained her employment until 2018, when she had no “choice but to retire due to her disability.” After her retirement, Stanley filed charges with the Florida Commission on Human Relations and the EEOC, at which point she received her right-to-sue letter. Stanley then sued the City of Sanford, alleging that the policy for benefits which limited the payment of premiums to 24 months after retirement or until receipt of Medicare benefits for those with disabilities was discriminatory. The District Court granted the City’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that Stanley as a former employee was not a “qualified individual with a disability” and therefore could not sue based on actions that took place after the employment relationship ended. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.

ISSUE PRESENTED

Whether, under the Americans with Disabilities Act, a former employee—who was qualified to perform her job and who earned post-employment benefits while employed—loses her right to sue over discrimination with respect to those benefits solely because she no longer holds her job.

THE ARGUMENTS

Petitioner

In the Petitioner’s brief on the merits, Stanley argues that the Eleventh Circuit misread the ADA’s requirements as to who can sue for what and when—i.e., that it has misinterpreted what “qualified individual with a disability” is in this context. Therefore, the Circuit Court erred in holding that a retiree is not a “qualified individual”. Petitioner argues that Congress never intended for retirees to be excluded from this group of potential litigants, even if it could have been clearer in defining “qualified individual with a disability.” To uphold the interpretation of the Eleventh Circuit would “make[] outright discrimination unlawful up until the employee’s last day of work—and then perfectly lawful the moment she clocks out for the last time.” Brief of Petitioner at 4.

Stanley notes that Title I of the ADA, which applies in this case, was intended to broadly protect against discrimination in the employment sphere. In light of the broad construction afforded the statute, the ADA permits former employees, including retirees, to sue with respect to discrimination of post-employment benefits. The Petitioner asserts that nowhere in the ADA does the text require that only those who hold or desire to hold a specific job are entitled to recovery, particularly because the statute states that a “qualified individual” is someone who “can perform essential functions” of a job. That is, Congress, in setting out the specific statutory language, was placing emphasis on the ability of the individual to carry out a job rather than the disability or the specific employment position. Petitioner notes that Congress would never intend for employers to be required to hire people who cannot perform essential job functions and that the ADA strikes a balance between employer needs and protection against discrimination on the basis of disability.

Further, Stanley notes that the ADA provides protections specifically regarding post-employment benefits and cites a variety of cases noting that employment benefits may accrue after a person’s employment. The Fair Pay Act specifically provides that a plaintiff’s claim may accrue even after the employment relationship ends. The Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation, therefore, is inconsistent.

The Petitioner also argues that the Eleventh Circuit misapplied these laws by finding that because the changes to her benefits occurred before she became disabled, the change was not actionable. In fact, the ADA was amended specifically to address this type of application by broadening protections for discrimination “on the basis of disability” rather than only against a qualified individual “with a disability.”

The Petitioner further argues that the courts in interpreting the ADA may read implied conditionality into the statute and that where there is no job being held, such as in the case of a retiree or former employee, there are no “essential functions,” and the test would be satisfied to allow former employees to bring a claim.

Finally, the Petitioner contends that the text of the statute at issue must be read in the context of the rest of the Act. Congress could have explicitly included or excluded retirees, but it did not. Alongside that, the statute specifically protects retirees by including protections for retirement and post-employment benefits.

Respondent

The Respondent’s brief on the merits will not be filed until October 21, 2024. However, in its Brief in Opposition to the Petition for Certiorari, the city of Sanford, Florida argues that Stanley failed to satisfy service-based criteria to receive the relevant post-employment benefits.

In the alternative, the city also argues that the “qualified individual” question is irrelevant and will not impact the outcome of the case. The city cites opinions from the Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits supporting this proposition, as well as three former Supreme Court cases finding this question to be “untrustworthy.”

The city cited the decisions of “all Circuit Courts” which hold that its actions are not in violation of the ADA regardless of how the “qualified individual” question resolves. It also noted a distinction between a “disabled retiree” and a “disability retiree”—where the former is qualified for a “normal retirement” or an “early retirement” as long as the requirements are met, and the latter qualifies for and accepts “disability retirement.”

Finally, the city argues the Eleventh Circuit’s decision is correct based on the plain language and purpose of Title I of the ADA defining “qualified individual,” that it was correct in finding the Fair Pay Act was irrelevant in analyzing the meaning of “qualified individual,” and that the amendments to the ADA did not expand who was a “qualified individual” under the statute.

Which arguments the city will make on the merits remains to be seen.

LOOKING FORWARD

The main implication of this case is the impact it will have on the ability of retirees—or even those in the employment market who are simply former employees of a discriminating entity—to pursue post-employment benefits that they have earned, simply because the discriminatory actions taken by the former employer accrue after the employment relationship ends. If the Supreme Court sides with the City of Sanford, Florida, employers will enjoy broad protection from discrimination suits under the ADA so long as they avoid litigation until after the employee leaves the workplace.

Find Alexandra on LinkedIn!