A circuit split has developed concerning whether applicants for asylum are required to receive notice of evidence needed for removal proceedings. The split centers on a provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) concerning burden of proof in granting asylum.

The question plaguing the circuit courts is whether the DHS’s expedited removal procedures allow aliens to contest only the factual basis for their removal, and not to raise legal arguments. If so, then a non-citizen has an arguable claim that he has not failed to exhaust his remedy; in other words, because there was no remedy to exhaust, the non-citizen is entitled to appellate review.

Based on this ruling by the CAFC, TC Heartland has begun the process of SCOTUS review, relying on the argument that CAFC has unilaterally overturned Supreme Court precedent in neglecting the holding of Fourco. As the amici briefs churn into the SCOTUS docket for this case, it raises the question of just where the Supreme Court will fall on this.

Equitable mootness prevents an appellate court from reaching the merits of an appeal. It is a judicially created, prudential doctrine unique to bankruptcy appeals. Specifically, the doctrine applies to appeals from orders confirming chapter 11 reorganization plans (but the circuits are even split on that point).

For a legal system that fetes both equality and predictability, the fact that neither non-citizens nor the State knows what the exact consequences are when a crime is committed is nonsensical and illogical. Non-citizens should have the heads up as to what will occur if they commit a crime. Part of this includes defining, once and for all, what our law means by “moral turpitude.” And, if we can’t, maybe it’s time we cut the turpitudinous knot.

The outcome of this circuit split will have large implications not only for the creditors filing these stale claims but also for the debtors.

If the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning is followed, then not only will creditors miss out on an opportunity to be repaid, but the debtor will now have a civil cause of action against the holder the debt.

On the other hand, if the Fourth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits are followed, holders of time barred debt will be able to continue to assert claims and hope to receive payment. And if this riveting split wasn’t reason enough to follow this case, the Supreme Court just granted cert to Johnson v. Midland.

It’s always a terrible feeling to be late. It can incite panic as you rush to finish a task. Being late by just one day has disqualified mayoral and Presidential candidates from making it onto the ballot. In the bankruptcy context, being a day late can prevent you from escaping from sizable debts. If only you had one day more!

When a case litigated in court goes horribly wrong, there’s a clear remedy: appeal. But, what happens when your case goes not through court, but arbitration, and the proceedings are grossly unfair? You cannot appeal: that would seriously undermine the purposes of arbitration, to provide a fast resolution of a case at a cheaper cost than litigation. There is only one possible escape hatch: federal law provides that, in a limited set of very unfair situations, you can ask a court to vacate or modify the arbitrator’s award.

But if you bring this petition in federal court, another obstacle lurks in the background: the federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction to even consider a petition to vacate. A new circuit split has popped up on that question.

Should it be easier to sue your doctor or lawyer in federal court than in state court? The Eleventh Circuit purportedly says “yes,” while the Third and Tenth Circuits disagree. This consequential Erie Doctrine circuit split has complicated malpractice actions in federal courts for decades, and even touches some anti-SLAPP laws.

When does “or” mean “and”? When does “or” simply mean “or”? And whose job is it to decide—a Federal court or Congress?

Substantive or procedural? This age-old conceptual “split” lies at the heart of the Erie Doctrine, which we tackle here in our first post. The issue: when a state law imposes procedural requirements on litigants so as to advance a substantive policy goal, do those requirements apply in federal court? We have seen two circuit splits on this problem, so—befittingly—we have “split” our first post into two parts.