Federal law, as codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1495 and § 2513, provides the wrongfully convicted and imprisoned a mechanism to seek compensation from the United States government. 28 U.S.C. § 1495; United States v. Bala, 948 F.3d 948, 949 (8th Cir. 2020). Section 1495 grants jurisdiction for such cases to the Court of Federal Claims, but to be eligible, a person must first obtain a “certificate of innocence” from the court that reverses or sets aside the conviction. 28 U.S.C. § 2513 (a)(1). The decision to grant or deny a certificate is left to the discretion of the district court. United States v. Graham, 608 F.3d 164, 169 (4th Cir. 2010); Betts v. United States, 10 F.3d 1278, 1283 (7th Cir. 1993).

How can courts act in the pursuit of justice when a robber is also a victim?  Marjory Dingwall confessed to three counts of robbery and three counts of brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence, but she claimed she committed them under duress, fearing the violence she had come to expect from her abusive boyfriend.

For a legal system that fetes both equality and predictability, the fact that neither non-citizens nor the State knows what the exact consequences are when a crime is committed is nonsensical and illogical. Non-citizens should have the heads up as to what will occur if they commit a crime. Part of this includes defining, once and for all, what our law means by “moral turpitude.” And, if we can’t, maybe it’s time we cut the turpitudinous knot.

When does “or” mean “and”? When does “or” simply mean “or”? And whose job is it to decide—a Federal court or Congress?