The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures by the government. However, a litigant must have the standing to challenge a governmental action under the Fourth Amendment. To establish Fourth Amendment standing, a party must show that their reasonable expectations of privacy have been infringed upon. In the context of mail, standing can present a unique obstacle for a claimant. The Circuit Courts have disagreed about what reasonable privacy expectations an individual who uses a nickname or alias has in the mail they intend to send or receive.

In 2015, the Supreme Court reviewed the case of Michael Kingsley, a pretrial detainee who suffered a brutal assault at the hands of his jailers and sued them for using excessive force in violation of his rights. The Court held in Kingsley v. Hendrickson that claims of excessive force against a pretrial detainee must be evaluated against an objective standard. This means that when a court is determining whether excessive force is used, it must do so from the point of view of the reasonable officer who was present at the time (as opposed to the perspective of the specific officer involved). The Court explained that “the Due Process Clause protects pretrial detainees from excessive force that amounts to punishment,” which can occur when the force at issue is not “reasonably related to the legitimate purpose of holding detainees for trial.”

The 6th Circuit granted habeas relief on the grounds that the Michigan State Court did not show that the shackling did not have a substantial and injurious effect on the jury’s verdict. In doing so, they applied the Brecht test, but not the AEDPA examination of whether the state court’s decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.

What is the appropriate standard of review for a federal court deciding whether to grant habeas relief?

Federal courts have long avoided reading statutes as applicable on foreign soil, except when Congress clearly indicates as such, by using the canon of statutory interpretation known as the presumption against extraterritoriality. Some courts, however, have used a 1922 Supreme Court decision, United States v. Bowman, to justify applying § 1114 outside American borders.

Can 18 USC § 1114 criminalize killing or attempting to kill an officer or employee of the United States outside the territory of the United States?

When it comes to civilians recording police actions, the First Amendment and doctrine of qualified immunity often come into conflict with each other.

Is there a First Amendment right to record the police in public, and does this right outweigh the doctrine of qualified immunity?

In formulating the prison mailbox rule, the Houston Court specified the struggles of “pro se prisoner[s]” in filing paperwork. So, does this rule, where a prisoner’s notice of appeal is filed when he hands it to prison officials to be mailed, apply to all prisoners, including those represented by counsel (broad interpretation), or only to pro se prisoners (narrow interpretation)?