Federal courts have held for decades that interactive computer services cannot be considered publishers for the purpose of determining liability to users for content published by third parties. This area of the law was developed in the infancy of the internet, and technology has advanced leaps and bounds faster than the law has.

The relevant statute in these cases is 47 U.S.C. § 230 (the Communications Decency Act of 1996), which states that “no provider or use of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” In lay terms, online media platforms (think YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, etc.) that host content created and/or shared by third-party users cannot be held liable unless the provider is directly responsible for creating it.

Discriminatory intent claims involve proving that an intentional action, motivated by a discriminatory purpose, caused harm. This is sometimes also called disparate treatment. In contrast, a disparate impact claim can be brought when no intentional discrimination is apparent, but the outcomes of an action have negatively impacted a protected class. In the case of the Americans with Disabilities Act and its amendments in Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1974, this protected class is individuals with disabilities.

The 6th Circuit granted habeas relief on the grounds that the Michigan State Court did not show that the shackling did not have a substantial and injurious effect on the jury’s verdict. In doing so, they applied the Brecht test, but not the AEDPA examination of whether the state court’s decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.

What is the appropriate standard of review for a federal court deciding whether to grant habeas relief?

Karen Hepp is a news anchor for Fox 29 in Philadelphia. In 2019, she filed a lawsuit in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against Facebook after discovering that the company was advertising a dating website using her image. The claim pertinent here was a violation of Pennsylvania’s right of publicity law. Since Hepp was a public figure who depended on a carefully cultivated image for her success, she argued that her image on a dating website without her authorization jeopardized that image. The District Court dismissed her state law claims on the basis that Section 230 only exempted federal intellectual property claims from immunity.

Are state law claims for violation of a right to publicity immunized from lawsuits by Section 230 of the CDA?

When it comes to civilians recording police actions, the First Amendment and doctrine of qualified immunity often come into conflict with each other.

Is there a First Amendment right to record the police in public, and does this right outweigh the doctrine of qualified immunity?

The Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) was passed in 1991 to regulate the emerging practice of telemarketing, in which an automatic dialing system or prerecorded voice makes automatic calls to consumers to market products or services. The TCPA also regulates other forms of electronic communication, such as through text messaging and faxing.

Does a defendant have Article III standing under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act even if the alleged injury is a single text message?