Federal courts have held for decades that interactive computer services cannot be considered publishers for the purpose of determining liability to users for content published by third parties. This area of the law was developed in the infancy of the internet, and technology has advanced leaps and bounds faster than the law has.

The relevant statute in these cases is 47 U.S.C. § 230 (the Communications Decency Act of 1996), which states that “no provider or use of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” In lay terms, online media platforms (think YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, etc.) that host content created and/or shared by third-party users cannot be held liable unless the provider is directly responsible for creating it.

Discriminatory intent claims involve proving that an intentional action, motivated by a discriminatory purpose, caused harm. This is sometimes also called disparate treatment. In contrast, a disparate impact claim can be brought when no intentional discrimination is apparent, but the outcomes of an action have negatively impacted a protected class. In the case of the Americans with Disabilities Act and its amendments in Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1974, this protected class is individuals with disabilities.

How can courts act in the pursuit of justice when a robber is also a victim?  Marjory Dingwall confessed to three counts of robbery and three counts of brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence, but she claimed she committed them under duress, fearing the violence she had come to expect from her abusive boyfriend.

In 2015, the Supreme Court reviewed the case of Michael Kingsley, a pretrial detainee who suffered a brutal assault at the hands of his jailers and sued them for using excessive force in violation of his rights. The Court held in Kingsley v. Hendrickson that claims of excessive force against a pretrial detainee must be evaluated against an objective standard. This means that when a court is determining whether excessive force is used, it must do so from the point of view of the reasonable officer who was present at the time (as opposed to the perspective of the specific officer involved). The Court explained that “the Due Process Clause protects pretrial detainees from excessive force that amounts to punishment,” which can occur when the force at issue is not “reasonably related to the legitimate purpose of holding detainees for trial.”

The 6th Circuit granted habeas relief on the grounds that the Michigan State Court did not show that the shackling did not have a substantial and injurious effect on the jury’s verdict. In doing so, they applied the Brecht test, but not the AEDPA examination of whether the state court’s decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.

What is the appropriate standard of review for a federal court deciding whether to grant habeas relief?

In formulating the prison mailbox rule, the Houston Court specified the struggles of “pro se prisoner[s]” in filing paperwork. So, does this rule, where a prisoner’s notice of appeal is filed when he hands it to prison officials to be mailed, apply to all prisoners, including those represented by counsel (broad interpretation), or only to pro se prisoners (narrow interpretation)?

Is the discharge of pollutants without a permit from a point source into groundwater, which then leads to the discharge of these pollutants into navigable waters, prohibited under the CWA? Does the CWA ban only the discharge of pollutants from point sources directly into navigable waters?