The First Amendment to the United States Constitution protects individuals’ rights to free speech and freedom of religion. As such, the U.S. government is generally not permitted to punish individuals for exercising First Amendment free speech. This includes arrests for criminal activity made by a police officer to retaliate against an individual for their protected speech. Under 42 USC §1983, an individual can bring a civil suit for wrongful arrest, including retaliatory arrest, in violation of their First Amendment rights if there is a “but-for” causal connection between the officer’s retaliatory animus and the individual's speech. Kennedy v. City of Villa Hills, 635 F.3d. 210, 217 (6th Cir. 2011).

The First Amendment of the United States Constitution protects an individual's right to free speech and the free exercise of their religion. However, the Circuit Courts have disagreed on the line between religious freedom, free speech, and a state’s ability to protect its minor citizens from harmful practices.

Conversion therapy is a discredited therapeutic practice that seeks to change an individual’s sexual orientation from gay or bisexual to heterosexual and an individual’s gender identity from transgender or non-binary to cisgender. Mainstream psychological experts have denounced conversion therapy. The American Psychological Association states that “[conversion therapy] puts individuals at a significant risk of harm.”

Federal courts have held for decades that interactive computer services cannot be considered publishers for the purpose of determining liability to users for content published by third parties. This area of the law was developed in the infancy of the internet, and technology has advanced leaps and bounds faster than the law has.

The relevant statute in these cases is 47 U.S.C. § 230 (the Communications Decency Act of 1996), which states that “no provider or use of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” In lay terms, online media platforms (think YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, etc.) that host content created and/or shared by third-party users cannot be held liable unless the provider is directly responsible for creating it.

How can courts act in the pursuit of justice when a robber is also a victim?  Marjory Dingwall confessed to three counts of robbery and three counts of brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence, but she claimed she committed them under duress, fearing the violence she had come to expect from her abusive boyfriend.

In 2015, the Supreme Court reviewed the case of Michael Kingsley, a pretrial detainee who suffered a brutal assault at the hands of his jailers and sued them for using excessive force in violation of his rights. The Court held in Kingsley v. Hendrickson that claims of excessive force against a pretrial detainee must be evaluated against an objective standard. This means that when a court is determining whether excessive force is used, it must do so from the point of view of the reasonable officer who was present at the time (as opposed to the perspective of the specific officer involved). The Court explained that “the Due Process Clause protects pretrial detainees from excessive force that amounts to punishment,” which can occur when the force at issue is not “reasonably related to the legitimate purpose of holding detainees for trial.”

The 6th Circuit granted habeas relief on the grounds that the Michigan State Court did not show that the shackling did not have a substantial and injurious effect on the jury’s verdict. In doing so, they applied the Brecht test, but not the AEDPA examination of whether the state court’s decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.

What is the appropriate standard of review for a federal court deciding whether to grant habeas relief?

Karen Hepp is a news anchor for Fox 29 in Philadelphia. In 2019, she filed a lawsuit in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against Facebook after discovering that the company was advertising a dating website using her image. The claim pertinent here was a violation of Pennsylvania’s right of publicity law. Since Hepp was a public figure who depended on a carefully cultivated image for her success, she argued that her image on a dating website without her authorization jeopardized that image. The District Court dismissed her state law claims on the basis that Section 230 only exempted federal intellectual property claims from immunity.

Are state law claims for violation of a right to publicity immunized from lawsuits by Section 230 of the CDA?

When it comes to civilians recording police actions, the First Amendment and doctrine of qualified immunity often come into conflict with each other.

Is there a First Amendment right to record the police in public, and does this right outweigh the doctrine of qualified immunity?

The Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) was passed in 1991 to regulate the emerging practice of telemarketing, in which an automatic dialing system or prerecorded voice makes automatic calls to consumers to market products or services. The TCPA also regulates other forms of electronic communication, such as through text messaging and faxing.

Does a defendant have Article III standing under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act even if the alleged injury is a single text message?

Under a wireless services contract that binds consumers to arbitrate any disputes with the providing company and its affiliates, may a satellite television company that became an affiliate of a wireless services provider several years after the signing of such contract compel arbitration when a consumer brings a suit under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act?