Maahi Sethi | Reasonable Accommodations Under The ADA

INTRODUCTION

Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act prohibits employers from discriminating against persons with disabilities when applying for employment, hiring, and job training. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). A common issue in enforcing this act is determining what accommodations employers can be reasonably expected to provide for their employees with disabilities. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).

EEOC v. Charter Communications LLC is a suit that addresses whether the ADA requires employers to accommodate an employee’s commute to work. 75 F.4th 729 (7th Cir. 2023). The appellant, James Kimmons, was employed at a call center owned and operated by Charter Communication LLC (Charter).  Kimmons requested that Charter make accommodations in his work schedule, which he claims were unlawfully denied. Due to the presence of cataracts in both of his eyes, commuting to work during evening hours became unsafe for Kimmons. Kimmons asked to modify his work schedule for thirty days to avoid traveling after sunset. Charter granted Kimmon’s initial request but did not allow Kimmons to continue working according to the modified work schedule at the end of the thirty days. The EEOC then filed a lawsuit claiming Charter’s refusal to accommodate was unlawful under Title I of the Americans with Disability Act (ADA). EEOC v. Charter Communications, LLC, 75 F.4th 729. 

ISSUE

Does the Americans with Disabilities Act require employers to accommodate an Employee's disability that creates difficulties commuting to work?

THE SPLIT

The Seventh Circuit

The Court, in affirming Charter’s motion for summary judgment, cited its reasoning in Brumfield v. City of Chicago to hold that since Kimmons could perform his essential job functions after reaching his place of work, Charter was not required to honor Kimmons' adjusted work schedule requests. 735 F.3d 619, 631-32 (7th Cir. 2013).

A Seventh Circuit precedent requires work-schedule accommodations if denying such accommodations impinges on an employee’s essential job function. However, this precedent does not address an employee’s commute between their residence and work, as seen in Charter. 

In Gile v. United Airlines, Inc., the Seventh Circuit upheld a jury verdict where a work-schedule accommodation would have made it more feasible for an employee to perform their essential job function. 213 F.3d 365, 368 (7th Cir. 2000). Further, in EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., the Seventh Circuit also upheld that commuting to an employee’s place of work was a “prerequisite” for performing their essential job functions. 417 F.3d 789, 796 (7th Cir. 2005).

In both cases, the opinion emphasizes accommodations made for employees performing their essential job functions. The question remains: is an employer required to make work schedule accommodations for an employee’s commute to their place of work under the ADA? In their opinion, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the answer is “maybe.” EEOC v. Charter Commc'ns, LLC, 75 F.4th 729, 731 (7th Cir. 2023).

The Second Circuit

The Second Circuit took a position that seemingly favors the EEOC’s position in Charter. In Lyons v. Legal Aid Society, an attorney injured in a traffic accident returned to work after several years and requested her employer pay for a parking space, which was refused. 68 F.3d 1512, 1516-17 (2d Cir. 1995). She then sued her employer under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. On appeal from a granted motion to dismiss, the Second Circuit reversed and upheld that an employee’s disability could require employers to accommodate commute-related requests as long as the accommodation pertains to the employee’s specific work functions. 68 F.3d 1512, 1516-17 (2d Cir. 1995).

The Third Circuit

The Third Circuit reached a similar interpretation to the Second Circuit in a case with a similar factual background as Charter. In Colwell v. Rite Aid Corp., an employee’s visual impairment made it difficult for her to commute to work during evening hours, resulting in her asking for a modified work schedule that was denied. 602 F.3d 495, 504 (3d Cir. 2010). 

The district court granted summary judgment to the employer on similar reasoning as the Seventh Circuit in Charter, stating accommodations for an employee’s commute are not required where an employee’s commute has no bearing on the work their job entails. 602 F.3d 495, 504 (3d Cir. 2010). While considering the Second Circuit’s holding in Lyons, the Third Circuit in Colwell held that the ADA can entitle an employee to work-schedule accommodations by an employer, should these accommodations be reasonable. 602 F.3d 495, 504 (3d Cir. 2010). 

LOOKING FORWARD

Accommodations being made for employees with disabilities—and how reasonable these accommodations are—depend on the particular circumstances of the dispute, making clarification on the law all the more necessary. However, The Supreme Court recently passed on an opportunity to further clarify what accommodations can be considered reasonable for purposes of the ADA. See Kincaid v. Williams, 143 S. Ct. 2414 (Mem) (2023); see also Williams v. Kincaid, 45 F.4th 759 (7th Cir. 2022).  Given the recent denial of certiorari in the Kincaid case, the courts will unlikely decide on a definitive stance for work-related commute accommodations under the ADA for the foreseeable future.