The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects against unreasonable seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. In pertinent part, the text of the Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” Id.

On August 31, 2020, Oyoma Asinor was photographing a protest near Lafayette Park in the District of Columbia when he was arrested by the Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”). The MPD took Mr. Asinor’s cell phone, camera, and other personal items incident to the arrest but released him later that day. Mr. Asinor was never charged with any crime resulting from the arrest. Despite Mr. Asinor’s repeated requests over the following months, the MPD withheld his property for nearly a year.

In 2022, the Supreme Court in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen rejected the means-end analysis that federal circuits had applied to Second Amendment challenges to firearm regulations in favor of a new, burden-shifting analytical framework. 597 U.S. 1 (2022). Post-Bruen, if the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual and their conduct, the Constitution “presumptively protects that conduct.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 24. The government must then justify its regulation by demonstrating that it is “consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Id.

In June 2024, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Duarte, 101 F.4th 657 (9th Cir. 2024), reviewed the conviction of Steven Duarte under a provision of the Gun Control Act of 1968 that bars the possession of a firearm by any person “who has been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

In 1989, the Supreme Court found in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services that State officials have no obligation to protect private citizens from violence or injury caused by other private citizens. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dept. of Soc. Services, 489 U.S. 189, 194 (1989) (finding county authorities not liable when a child in its custody was seriously injured by his father). Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained the Due Process Clause limits a state’s power to deprive individuals of “life, liberty, and property without due process,” but does not create an affirmative duty to protect individuals. Id. at 194, (quoting U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1). Thus, state actors cannot be held liable for harm caused to private citizens under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, in DeShaney, the Court identified two possible exceptions in which a private citizen may be entitled to protection. The first, known as the Special Relationship Exception, is often applied when a state incarcerates, institutionalizes, or restrains a person involuntarily. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 198-99; see Christopher M. Eisenhauer, Police Action and the State-Created Danger Doctrine: a Proposed Uniform Test, 120 DICK. L. REV. 893 (2016).

In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court ruled the Second Amendment confers an individual right to keep and bear arms to law-abiding, responsible citizens and “members of the political community” District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2790 (2008). In McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Court held the individual weapon-owning right to be a fundamental right incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 48 (2009).

More recently, many of the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal have examined precisely who can be considered a law-abiding citizen and members of the political community in this context. These cases have examined the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 992(g), a provision of the amended Gun Control Act of 1968 that prohibits the sale or possession of firearms to nine categories of individuals, including undocumented immigrants. Specifically, these cases have questioned whether the Second Amendment and the right to bear arms apply to undocumented immigrants, thereby making § 992(g) unconstitutional.

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution protects individuals’ rights to free speech and freedom of religion. As such, the U.S. government is generally not permitted to punish individuals for exercising First Amendment free speech. This includes arrests for criminal activity made by a police officer to retaliate against an individual for their protected speech. Under 42 USC §1983, an individual can bring a civil suit for wrongful arrest, including retaliatory arrest, in violation of their First Amendment rights if there is a “but-for” causal connection between the officer’s retaliatory animus and the individual's speech. Kennedy v. City of Villa Hills, 635 F.3d. 210, 217 (6th Cir. 2011).

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures by the government. However, a litigant must have the standing to challenge a governmental action under the Fourth Amendment. To establish Fourth Amendment standing, a party must show that their reasonable expectations of privacy have been infringed upon. In the context of mail, standing can present a unique obstacle for a claimant. The Circuit Courts have disagreed about what reasonable privacy expectations an individual who uses a nickname or alias has in the mail they intend to send or receive.

The 6th Circuit granted habeas relief on the grounds that the Michigan State Court did not show that the shackling did not have a substantial and injurious effect on the jury’s verdict. In doing so, they applied the Brecht test, but not the AEDPA examination of whether the state court’s decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.

What is the appropriate standard of review for a federal court deciding whether to grant habeas relief?

When it comes to civilians recording police actions, the First Amendment and doctrine of qualified immunity often come into conflict with each other.

Is there a First Amendment right to record the police in public, and does this right outweigh the doctrine of qualified immunity?

The Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) was passed in 1991 to regulate the emerging practice of telemarketing, in which an automatic dialing system or prerecorded voice makes automatic calls to consumers to market products or services. The TCPA also regulates other forms of electronic communication, such as through text messaging and faxing.

Does a defendant have Article III standing under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act even if the alleged injury is a single text message?

The most recent ruling on abortion restrictions came in June 2020, when the Supreme Court issued its’ opinion in the case of June Medical Services, LLC v. Russo (2020). In June Medical, the Court overturned the Fifth Circuit’s ruling that a Texas law that required abortion providers to have hospital admitting privileges did not place an undue burden on people seeking abortions, holding instead that the law was a violation of prior Supreme Court precedent. However, the divided Court failed to agree on a single standard for lower courts to apply to future abortion restrictions. The plurality argued that a balancing test, similar to the one advanced in the Court’s 2016 holding in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt (2016), should be applied to these restrictions, with the benefits of the laws being weighed against the potential burdens. Contrastingly, the Chief Justice, in his concurring opinion, advanced a standard that provided greater discretion to state legislatures. These contradicting standards have ultimately led to a single question: what June Medical standard should courts apply to state-level abortion restrictions?

In formulating the prison mailbox rule, the Houston Court specified the struggles of “pro se prisoner[s]” in filing paperwork. So, does this rule, where a prisoner’s notice of appeal is filed when he hands it to prison officials to be mailed, apply to all prisoners, including those represented by counsel (broad interpretation), or only to pro se prisoners (narrow interpretation)?