Rashmi Borah | Do Potential Deportees Have A Constitutional Right To Be Made Aware Of Discretionary Relief From Removal?
THE ISSUE
Section 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) lists reasons and conditions under which a potential deportee can request discretionary relief from removal. However, not all persons who are subject to deportation know that the possibility of relief is available. Because granting relief from removal is a wholly discretionary decision, deportees who fail to present their eligibility during their removal proceedings might not receive such relief.
Emilio Estrada is a Mexican citizen who was charged with illegal re-entry after deportation, and subject to deportation proceedings. Estrada’s attorneys failed to advise him about his possible eligibility for relief from deportation, and Estrada did not request discretionary relief. Estrada later collaterally attacked his deportation order, claiming that this failure constituted a violation of his due process rights. In United States v. Estrada (2017), the Sixth Circuit disagreed. Relying on precedent, the court stated that there is no constitutionally-protected right to be informed of relief from deportation because such relief is discretionary. The Sixth Circuit joins six of its sister circuits in this holding. But the Second and Ninth Circuits have held that there is a constitutionally-protected right to be informed of potential relief from deportation, and that a failure by an attorney or an immigration judge to make the potential deportee aware of such relief constitutes a due process violation.
THE SPLIT
In Estrada, the Sixth Circuit followed circuit precedent from Huicochea-Gomez v. INS (2001), stating that “an individual has no constitutionally-protected liberty interest in obtaining [or being informed of] discretionary relief from deportation.” The court further stated that the discretionary nature of the relief does not “create a protectable liberty or property interest,” and without such an interest, a due process violation cannot occur.
The Sixth Circuit joins the majority of its sister circuits in holding that an undocumented immigrant does not have a constitutional right to be informed of eligibility for discretionary relief:
In Smith v. Ashcroft (2002), the Fourth Circuit stated that “for a statute to create a vested liberty or property interest giving rise to procedural due process protection, it must confer more than a mere expectation…of a benefit. There must be entitlement to benefit as directed by statute.”
In United States v. Lopez-Ortiz (2002), the Fifth Circuit stated that “[discretionary relief] conveyed no rights, it conferred no status,” and its denial does not implicate the Due Process clause.”
In United States v Santiago-Ochoa (2006), the Seventh Circuit relied on dicta from a previous circuit decision, stating that “it would be hard to show that the loss of a chance at wholly discretionary relief from removal is the kind of deprivation of liberty or property that the due process clause was designed to protect.”
In Escudero-Corona v. INS (2001), the Eighth Circuit stated that “eligibility for suspension is not a right protected by the Constitution. Suspension of deportation is rather an act of grace that rests in the unfettered discretion of the Attorney General,” and as such, did not confer a constitutionally-protected right.
In United States v. Aguirre-Tello (2004), the Tenth Circuit held that an undocumented immigrant’s constitutionally-protected rights only included the right to “be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful place, and nothing more.”
In Oguejiofor v. Attorney General of the United States (2002), the Eleventh Circuit held that the petitioner could not assert a due process challenge because he had “no constitutionally-protected right to discretionary relief or to be eligible for discretionary relief.”
In contrast, the Second and Ninth Circuits have held that there is a constitutional right to be advised of discretionary relief:
In United States v. Copeland (2004), the Second Circuit stated that “[failing] to advise a potential deportee of a right to seek…discretionary relief can, if prejudicial, be fundamentally unfair.”
In United States v. Lopez-Velasquez (2010), the Ninth Circuit stated that “failure to advise an alien of his potential eligibility for discretionary relief violates due process.”
LOOKING FORWARD: THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION AND THE ROLE OF ATTORNEYS
The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in United States v. Lopez-Ortiz (2002). But given the current administration’s heightened enforcement of immigration laws and the constitutional question posed by this now-current issue, the circuits — and potential deportees and their families — would benefit from a clear ruling from the Supreme Court on this issue. The Sixth Circuit’s ruling brings to the forefront an issue that could have a tremendous and life-changing impact on potential deportees. Because Estrada considers a constitutional question, rather than challenging an actual exercise of discretion, this issue should not fall prey to the bar to judicial review of discretionary immigration decisions.
Estrada, and the cases cited above raise another concern — the failure by attorneys to make their clients aware of the potential for discretionary relief, which was the grounds upon which Mr. Estrada and other potential deportees claimed that their due process rights had been violated. This is not to suggest that attorneys are outright failing their clients. The INA is a complex statute and the grounds for relief are not entirely obvious or well-publicized. Section 212(h) of the INA provides an exhaustive list in of reasons upon which a potential deportee can request relief. While the measures for relief are discretionary and do not guarantee that a person’s deportation will be suspended, attorneys who are representing potential deportees should be aware that there are federal statutory provisions that could help them more thoroughly advocate for their clients. Attorneys — and even law students — who work with undocumented immigrants and others who could be subject to deportation proceedings can take steps to educate themselves and their colleagues on these measures.