Gretchen Boyles | Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, Missouri

INTRODUCTION

Lisa Muldrow served as a police sergeant for the St. Louis Police Department in the Intelligence Division for nine years. Within the division, Muldrow worked on violent crime cases—primarily in human trafficking and public corruption. Muldrow had experience working in the Gang Unit and as head of the Gun Crimes Unit.

When a new supervisor joined the division, Muldrow and the other women were transferred out of the Intelligence Division without notice. The supervisor, Michael Deeba, purportedly viewed Muldrow’s position in the division as too dangerous for a woman.

Whereas Muldrow had been a plain-clothes sergeant working at a desk on criminal investigations, she now would have to wear a bulletproof vest and uniform and was assigned a patrol area. Though she retained the same title and pay, she went from working 9-5 on weekdays in the Intelligence Division to working odd hours and weekends in the Fifth Division. Muldrow lost her FBI credentials and the cases she had worked on before the transfer. Muldrow faced questions from colleagues about why she had been transferred, which she alleges she struggled to answer due to Deeba’s lack of justification for the transfer.

Muldrow requested a transfer to a more desirable position as an administrative aid in a different division. Only sergeants could be administrative aids, and the role would have allowed Muldrow to wear plain clothes and have a schedule similar to her prior schedule in the Intelligence Division. Purportedly, administrative aids were to be hand-picked by the role’s supervisor. Muldrow alleges that superior officers told the supervisor that she could not select Muldrow as her administrative aid.

Muldrow filed a lawsuit alleging, among other claims, that the department violated Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination in “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” when she was involuntarily transferred and again when her requested transfer was denied.

The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri held that a discriminatory transfer which does not create a material employment disadvantage does not qualify as an adverse employment action. The district court held that the department's denial of Muldrow's subsequent transfer request would have no substantial impact on Muldrow's career prospects.

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that neither the forced transfer nor Muldrow’s subsequently denied transfer request were adverse employment actions, regardless of whether they were discriminatory. In so holding, the court reasoned that no materially significant disadvantages arose in either event.

ISSUE PRESENTED

Does Title VII prohibit discrimination as to all “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,” or is its reach limited to discriminatory employer conduct that courts determine causes materially significant disadvantages for employees? In other words, are discriminatory job transfers lawful when they do not impose “materially significant disadvantages” on employees?

THE ARGUMENTS

The petitioner argues that Title VII has been applied unevenly across federal circuits and that every circuit has deviated from applying the plain text of Title VII. Specifically, petitioners argue that the phrase “terms, conditions, and privileges” in Title VII prohibits the discrimination Muldrow experienced. The inclusion of the words "terms, conditions, and privileges" in addition to the language of "compensation" means that the statute prohibits discriminatory adverse employment actions beyond wage discrimination or termination of employment. The petitioners argue that the current restrictive application of Title VII permits open discrimination in materially adverse ways and should therefore be corrected.

The respondent argues there is no circuit split for the Court to address. Further, the respondent argues this case is not the appropriate vehicle to address the question presented. Respondent maintains the transfer of Muldrow was not discriminatory, as both men and women were transferred across the department. Muldrow, the respondent asserts, failed to show any material difference between the two sergeant positions. The lack of material difference renders any potential discriminatory action not within the scope of Title VII and therefore permissible.

The United States submitted an amicus brief in the case, asserting Title VII does not differentiate between significant and non-significant disadvantages. Additionally, none of the Court's precedent lends support to the conclusion that such a distinction should be made. Instead, Title VII plainly prohibits all discriminatory transfers, and this prohibition aligns with the statute's overarching purpose.

LOOKING FORWARD

Though the facts before the Court are limited to discriminatory transfers or denial of transfers, the question presented requires the Court to define potentially very broad terminology. If the Court finds for the petitioner, a wide variety of currently permissible employment discrimination will become prohibited. If the Court does not find for the petitioner, the Court could affirm the significant disadvantage distinction some circuits rely on or could even articulate an altogether new test that binds every circuit. In either scenario, the Court will likely clarify what is included in the “terms, conditions, and privileges” of employment—and what may not be included.