Caroline Baltay | Culley v. Marshall
INTRODUCTION
This case arises from the consolidation of two similar cases. The city of Satsuma, Alabama, seized Ms. Halima Culley’s car after her son was pulled over while driving it and charged with possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia. Ms. Lena Sutton’s car was seized after a friend was pulled over by Leesburg, Alabama police while driving and charged with possession of methamphetamine. Culley and Sutton used the innocent-owner defense and obtained summary judgment on the corresponding civil asset forfeiture cases.
With Culley filing in the Southern District of Alabama and Sutton filing in the Northern District, each claimed that under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, their rights were violated by the defendants’ failure to provide prompt deprivation hearings. Both district courts ruled for the defendants, following Eleventh Circuit precedent and the test set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) rather than the test in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
Culley and Sutton appealed to the Eleventh Circuit, where all but the monetary damages claims were deemed moot. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the rulings of the district courts, holding that temporary seizure of vehicles are not ‘fines’ under the Eighth Amendment. The three-judge panel also held the district courts correctly applied the Barker test to the plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claims pursuant to precedent set in Gonzales v. Rivkind, 858 F.2d 657 (11th Cir. 1988).
ISSUE PRESENTED
Whether the Due Process Clause requires a state or local government to provide a post-seizure probable cause hearing prior to a statutory judicial forfeiture proceeding and, if so, when such a hearing must take place, should district courts apply the “speedy trial” test employed in United States v. $8,850, 461 U.S. 555 (1983) and Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), as held by the Eleventh Circuit or the three-part due process analysis set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) as held by at least the Second, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits.
THE ARGUMENTS
Petitioners argue that rather than following the Barker speedy trial test, the Court should follow the Second, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits in using the three-part due process analysis set forth in Mathews. The Due Process clause requires that claimants receive an early opportunity to test the probable validity of further deprivation. If the three Mathews factors are applied ((1) private interest, (2) risk of erroneous deprivation, and (3) governmental interest), the petitioners claim that a hearing would be due. See Mathews, 424 U.S. 319 at 335.
The respondents argue that petitioners misunderstood the statute and ignored their options to post bond or expedite to reclaim their vehicles. The respondents assert that the Barker test, which weighs four factors ((1) length of delay, (2) reason for delay, (3) claimant’s assertion of rights, and (4) prejudice to claimant) was correctly applied and establishes that the forfeiture proceeding itself provided the required hearing to satisfy due process. See United States v. $8,850 in Currency, 461 U.S. 555, 564 (1983). While the respondents argue that Barker was correctly applied, they additionally state that due process was received under either test, so the claims should fail, and there exists no need to analyze the split further.
LOOKING FORWARD
This case is important in all future asset forfeiture cases. The Court’s decision between the Barker test and the Mathews test will affect whether a person whose personal property has been seized receives a post-seizure hearing other than the forfeiture proceeding itself. This could affect those burdened by not having their assets, such as vehicles, for long stretches of time. Although Respondents assert that it was due to their own lack of mitigation, Culley and Sutton each had to go without their vehicles for many months for crimes they did not commit. While the Barker factors do consider the claimant’s rights, the Mathews test could be considered fairer and less vague in that it balances the claimant's interests against the government, allowing the owner to be heard. See Barker, 407 U.S. 514; Mathews, 424 U.S. 319.