Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), a refugee seeking asylum must prove she “(1) has a well-founded fear of persecution; (2) on account of a protected ground [e.g., race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion]; (3) by an organization that the Salvadorian government is unable or unwilling to control” Hernandez-Avalos v. Lynch, 784 F.3d at 949 (4th Cir. 2015).

Odalis Mireida Chicas-Machado, a native citizen of El Salvador, faced escalating persecution from MS-13 gang members during her walks to and from church. Chicas-Machado v. Garland, 73 F.4th 261, 263 (4th Cir. 2023). Due to harassment from gang members to have her abet their activity—and their subsequent death threats when she refused—she sought asylum in the United States, contending that her religious beliefs and activities with the church made her a target. Id. at 264. However, both the Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denied her application, questioning the nexus between her persecution and religion, as well as the viability of her proposed social groups. Id. Chicas-Machado sought review of the decision, emphasizing the life-threatening circumstances she fled in pursuit of safety and protection. Id.

In 1989, the Supreme Court found in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services that State officials have no obligation to protect private citizens from violence or injury caused by other private citizens. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dept. of Soc. Services, 489 U.S. 189, 194 (1989) (finding county authorities not liable when a child in its custody was seriously injured by his father). Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained the Due Process Clause limits a state’s power to deprive individuals of “life, liberty, and property without due process,” but does not create an affirmative duty to protect individuals. Id. at 194, (quoting U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1). Thus, state actors cannot be held liable for harm caused to private citizens under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, in DeShaney, the Court identified two possible exceptions in which a private citizen may be entitled to protection. The first, known as the Special Relationship Exception, is often applied when a state incarcerates, institutionalizes, or restrains a person involuntarily. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 198-99; see Christopher M. Eisenhauer, Police Action and the State-Created Danger Doctrine: a Proposed Uniform Test, 120 DICK. L. REV. 893 (2016).

Judicial immunity has its roots in traditional English common law and has long been recognized by federal courts. See Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 347 (1871). The Supreme Court upheld this immunity after the passage of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which created liability for state actors who deprive citizens or other persons of their Constitutional rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1982; Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967). The question courts ask when determining liability in § 1983 cases is whether, under common law principles of immunity, the defendant would be immune from suit due to their judicial or quasi-judicial role. See, e.g. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 339-40 (1986). The Supreme Court has established a presumption that only qualified immunity is necessary for government officials, refusing to expand absolute immunity beyond what is truly necessary. Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486-87 (1991). The general test is whether the defendant is serving a function that existed—or is analogous to a function that existed—under English common law that would entitle him to absolute immunity, but courts still come to different results based on the specific test they decide to use. This is the apparent reason for the circuit split discussed below.

Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act prohibits employers from discriminating against persons with disabilities when applying for employment, hiring, and job training. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). A common issue in enforcing this act is determining what accommodations employers can be reasonably expected to provide for their employees with disabilities. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).

EEOC v. Charter Communications LLC is a suit that addresses whether the ADA requires employers to accommodate an employee’s commute to work. 75 F.4th 729 (7th Cir. 2023). The appellant, James Kimmons, was employed at a call center owned and operated by Charter Communication LLC (Charter). Kimmons requested that Charter make accommodations in his work schedule, which he claims were unlawfully denied. Due to the presence of cataracts in both of his eyes, commuting to work during evening hours became unsafe for Kimmons. Kimmons asked to modify his work schedule for thirty days to avoid traveling after sunset. Charter granted Kimmon’s initial request but did not allow Kimmons to continue working according to the modified work schedule at the end of the thirty days. The EEOC then filed a lawsuit claiming Charter’s refusal to accommodate was unlawful under Title I of the Americans with Disability Act (ADA). EEOC v. Charter Communications, LLC, 75 F.4th 729.

In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court ruled the Second Amendment confers an individual right to keep and bear arms to law-abiding, responsible citizens and “members of the political community” District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2790 (2008). In McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Court held the individual weapon-owning right to be a fundamental right incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 48 (2009).

More recently, many of the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal have examined precisely who can be considered a law-abiding citizen and members of the political community in this context. These cases have examined the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 992(g), a provision of the amended Gun Control Act of 1968 that prohibits the sale or possession of firearms to nine categories of individuals, including undocumented immigrants. Specifically, these cases have questioned whether the Second Amendment and the right to bear arms apply to undocumented immigrants, thereby making § 992(g) unconstitutional.

The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause provides that no State shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of the law.” A caveat to this right is that incarcerated individuals are not guaranteed its full scope. Because of their limited liberty rights, solitary confinement has been successfully implemented in a number of both state and federal prisons throughout the United States. In the summer of 2021, more than 6,000 inmates had been in solitary confinement for over a year. As of this week, over 10,000 inmates in federal prison alone are being held in solitary confinement.

The current circuit court split lies in whether there should be a minimum length for the duration of confinement to be considered an atypical hardship giving rise to a liberty interest.

Social media has become a prominent part of everyday life. It is regarded by many as the modern-day equivalent of the town forum. The Pew Research Center finds that over 70% of American adults use some form of social media, and almost all of those users get news content from them. It is one of the foremost means of communication in our modern world. Views of social media censorship, especially related to certain political news and politicians, have shifted in recent years. Generally, social media users have differing views on whether Big Tech should be regulated more heavily by the U.S. government in response to these perceptions of censorship.

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution protects individuals’ rights to free speech and freedom of religion. As such, the U.S. government is generally not permitted to punish individuals for exercising First Amendment free speech. This includes arrests for criminal activity made by a police officer to retaliate against an individual for their protected speech. Under 42 USC §1983, an individual can bring a civil suit for wrongful arrest, including retaliatory arrest, in violation of their First Amendment rights if there is a “but-for” causal connection between the officer’s retaliatory animus and the individual's speech. Kennedy v. City of Villa Hills, 635 F.3d. 210, 217 (6th Cir. 2011).

The First Amendment of the United States Constitution protects an individual's right to free speech and the free exercise of their religion. However, the Circuit Courts have disagreed on the line between religious freedom, free speech, and a state’s ability to protect its minor citizens from harmful practices.

Conversion therapy is a discredited therapeutic practice that seeks to change an individual’s sexual orientation from gay or bisexual to heterosexual and an individual’s gender identity from transgender or non-binary to cisgender. Mainstream psychological experts have denounced conversion therapy. The American Psychological Association states that “[conversion therapy] puts individuals at a significant risk of harm.”

Federal courts have held for decades that interactive computer services cannot be considered publishers for the purpose of determining liability to users for content published by third parties. This area of the law was developed in the infancy of the internet, and technology has advanced leaps and bounds faster than the law has.

The relevant statute in these cases is 47 U.S.C. § 230 (the Communications Decency Act of 1996), which states that “no provider or use of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” In lay terms, online media platforms (think YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, etc.) that host content created and/or shared by third-party users cannot be held liable unless the provider is directly responsible for creating it.

Discriminatory intent claims involve proving that an intentional action, motivated by a discriminatory purpose, caused harm. This is sometimes also called disparate treatment. In contrast, a disparate impact claim can be brought when no intentional discrimination is apparent, but the outcomes of an action have negatively impacted a protected class. In the case of the Americans with Disabilities Act and its amendments in Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1974, this protected class is individuals with disabilities.

How can courts act in the pursuit of justice when a robber is also a victim?  Marjory Dingwall confessed to three counts of robbery and three counts of brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence, but she claimed she committed them under duress, fearing the violence she had come to expect from her abusive boyfriend.

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures by the government. However, a litigant must have the standing to challenge a governmental action under the Fourth Amendment. To establish Fourth Amendment standing, a party must show that their reasonable expectations of privacy have been infringed upon. In the context of mail, standing can present a unique obstacle for a claimant. The Circuit Courts have disagreed about what reasonable privacy expectations an individual who uses a nickname or alias has in the mail they intend to send or receive.

In 2015, the Supreme Court reviewed the case of Michael Kingsley, a pretrial detainee who suffered a brutal assault at the hands of his jailers and sued them for using excessive force in violation of his rights. The Court held in Kingsley v. Hendrickson that claims of excessive force against a pretrial detainee must be evaluated against an objective standard. This means that when a court is determining whether excessive force is used, it must do so from the point of view of the reasonable officer who was present at the time (as opposed to the perspective of the specific officer involved). The Court explained that “the Due Process Clause protects pretrial detainees from excessive force that amounts to punishment,” which can occur when the force at issue is not “reasonably related to the legitimate purpose of holding detainees for trial.”

The 6th Circuit granted habeas relief on the grounds that the Michigan State Court did not show that the shackling did not have a substantial and injurious effect on the jury’s verdict. In doing so, they applied the Brecht test, but not the AEDPA examination of whether the state court’s decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.

What is the appropriate standard of review for a federal court deciding whether to grant habeas relief?

Karen Hepp is a news anchor for Fox 29 in Philadelphia. In 2019, she filed a lawsuit in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against Facebook after discovering that the company was advertising a dating website using her image. The claim pertinent here was a violation of Pennsylvania’s right of publicity law. Since Hepp was a public figure who depended on a carefully cultivated image for her success, she argued that her image on a dating website without her authorization jeopardized that image. The District Court dismissed her state law claims on the basis that Section 230 only exempted federal intellectual property claims from immunity.

Are state law claims for violation of a right to publicity immunized from lawsuits by Section 230 of the CDA?

Federal courts have long avoided reading statutes as applicable on foreign soil, except when Congress clearly indicates as such, by using the canon of statutory interpretation known as the presumption against extraterritoriality. Some courts, however, have used a 1922 Supreme Court decision, United States v. Bowman, to justify applying § 1114 outside American borders.

Can 18 USC § 1114 criminalize killing or attempting to kill an officer or employee of the United States outside the territory of the United States?

When it comes to civilians recording police actions, the First Amendment and doctrine of qualified immunity often come into conflict with each other.

Is there a First Amendment right to record the police in public, and does this right outweigh the doctrine of qualified immunity?

The Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) was passed in 1991 to regulate the emerging practice of telemarketing, in which an automatic dialing system or prerecorded voice makes automatic calls to consumers to market products or services. The TCPA also regulates other forms of electronic communication, such as through text messaging and faxing.

Does a defendant have Article III standing under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act even if the alleged injury is a single text message?

The most recent ruling on abortion restrictions came in June 2020, when the Supreme Court issued its’ opinion in the case of June Medical Services, LLC v. Russo (2020). In June Medical, the Court overturned the Fifth Circuit’s ruling that a Texas law that required abortion providers to have hospital admitting privileges did not place an undue burden on people seeking abortions, holding instead that the law was a violation of prior Supreme Court precedent. However, the divided Court failed to agree on a single standard for lower courts to apply to future abortion restrictions. The plurality argued that a balancing test, similar to the one advanced in the Court’s 2016 holding in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt (2016), should be applied to these restrictions, with the benefits of the laws being weighed against the potential burdens. Contrastingly, the Chief Justice, in his concurring opinion, advanced a standard that provided greater discretion to state legislatures. These contradicting standards have ultimately led to a single question: what June Medical standard should courts apply to state-level abortion restrictions?