Imagine: you’re a non-citizen sitting before an immigration judge, waiting to hear if the burglary you just committed means you’re going to be deported. Then imagine your lawyer told you your chances of deportation hinge on how the immigration judge defines “moral turpitude.”
It sounds bad, huh? Well, it’s not “meaningless,” as Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit claimed. Arias v. Lynch (2016). Rather, it has many meanings, depending on which federal circuit court of appeals you ask. Everyone recognizes that immigration law is hard. It’s hard because you’re dealing with humans and oftentimes making decisions that have profound effects on the lives of these humans. (Thank goodness other practices of law don’t have these issues, too.)
It’s very important that our courts come to a consensus about what exactly moral turpitude means. A lack of agreement means that a non-citizen in Illinois might be deported for the same crime that a non-citizen in Texas wasn’t deported for. This is kind of a big deal, constitutionally speaking, because due process, equal protection, life, liberty—I think you get the point.
The circuits are split between a two-step test and a three-step test.
The Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits follow the two-step test, as described in Prudencio v. Holder (4th Cir. 2012):
- (1) “[W]e first apply the categorical approach…This analysis requires that we examine the statutory elements of the crime, and not consider the facts or conduct of the particular violation at issue.”
- (2) “[If] the categorical approach does not resolve our inquiry… we proceed under the modified categorical approach… Under the modified categorical approach, we review the record of conviction to determine whether the crime of which [the defendant] was convicted qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude.”
The Seventh and Eighth Circuits follow the three-step test, as descried in Mata-Guerrero v. Holder (7th Cir. 2010):
- (1) “First, the immigration judge should focus on the statute’s actual scope and application and ask whether, at the time of the alien’s removal proceeding, any actual (not hypothetical) case existed in which the statute was applied to conduct that did not involve moral turpitude, including the alien’s own conviction….
- (2) “If that evaluation of a “realistic probability” does not resolve the question, the judge should proceed to a “modified categorical” approach, examining the record of conviction, including documents such as the indictment, the judgment of conviction, jury instructions, a signed guilty plea, or a guilty plea transcript….
- (3) “Then, where those records of conviction also fail to shed light on the question, the Attorney General instructs that the immigration judge should consider any evidence beyond those records “if doing so is necessary and appropriate to ensure proper application of the Act’s moral turpitude provisions.”
Why This Matters
For non-citizens, this split can be the difference between staying in the country or being deported. Consider the Arias case linked above. In the case, the non-citizen was charged with falsely using a social security number in order to find work. The Seventh Circuit had not decided prior whether such a violation constituted moral turpitude. It noted, however, that the circuits were split on the matter:
The Fifth and Eighth Circuits have said yes (including opinions regarding the closely related subparagraph, § 408(a)(7)(A)). Guardado‐Garcia v. Holder, 615 F.3d 900, 901–02 (8th Cir. 2010); Lateef v. Department of Homeland Security, 592 F.3d 926, 929 (8th Cir. 2010) (§ 408(a)(7)(A)); Hyder v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 388, 392 (5th Cir. 2007) (§ 408(a)(7)(A)). The Ninth Circuit has said no. Beltran‐Tirado v. I.N.S., 213 F.3d 1179, 1184 (9th Cir. 2000).
Circuits are split not just on how to define moral turpitude, but on what crimes even constitute moral turpitude. This is an obvious consequence of a system of law that requires a phrase as empty as “moral turpitude” to bear a Sisyphean load. And remember: the Fifth and Ninth Circuits use the same test to define moral turpitude—that those circuits cannot decide on what crimes constitute moral turpitude underscores just how entangled and ill-defined the law has become.
For a legal system that fetes both equality and predictability, the fact that neither non-citizens nor the State knows what the exact consequences are when a crime is committed is nonsensical and illogical. Non-citizens should have the heads up as to what will occur if they commit a crime. Part of this includes defining, once and for all, what our law means by “moral turpitude.” And, if we can’t, maybe it’s time we cut the turpitudinous knot.